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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the motivation of monetary transfers received 
by household heads. Indeed, the financial transfers may be motivated by altruism 
or by the expectation of future services. For this reason, we select a sample of 
Italian families from the 2006 European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset. The empirical analysis is divided into two parts. 
First, we consider the transfer decision and try to account for the factors that 
affect the probability that the household member will receive a transfer. Next, we 
restrict our analysis to those families who did receive a positive transfer and 
examine the factors that affect the size of the transfer. The economic interest in 
the intrinsic explanation of monetary transfers is supported by the efficacy of 
policy makers instruments. For this reason, we also explore the relationship 
between private and public financial transfers. The main contribution to the 
existing literature is to investigate the social motivation of private transfers and 
their implications in terms of policy in a unified framework.   
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1. Introduction 
According to the literature, private transfers are relevant both in developing 
countries and in highly developed economies (Danziger, Havernan and Plotnick 
1981; Lampman and Smeeding 1983; Kotlikoff 1988; Guiso and Jappelli 1991). 
Moreover, private transfers are important for their persistence also across 
generations (Deb, Okten and Osili 2010). An interesting element of private 
transfers to be analyzed is the motivation. Indeed, as explained in Hochguertel 
and Ohlsson (2009), parents’ transfers motives are important for income 
redistribution, savings and public finance. The motivation underlying a transfer 
decision may be relative to altruism or exchange motive. According to Becker 
(1974), an individual cares about the well-being of other individuals in the 
altruistic framework, while according to Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985), 
the parent makes transfers to the children in order to obtain services from them. 
It is possible to identify also a different behavior for family members. Indeed, 
Berry (2008) investigates to what extent young adult children can rely on their 
parents for financial support and he finds that parents give more inter vivos 
financial assistance to their disadvantaged children rather than focusing on 
children most able to give financial help in return.  
As explained in Barro (1974), the motives for private transfers are relevant for 
public policies that redistribute income. There are different ways to analyse the 
altruistic hypothesis in the literature. First, there are models which consider the 
bequest data (Ishikawa, 1975; Becker and Tomes, 1979; Adams, 1980; Menchik 
and David, 1983). The result,  that the bequest received is negatively associated to 
the recipient income, reveals that the altruistic hypothesis may be supported. 
Second, there are models which consider the way bequest behavior affects wealth 
mobility (Blinder, 1973; Menchik, 1979 and 1980). In this context, the bequest 
rules assume a relevant role and not the characteristics of potential recipients. 
Third, there is an empirical research which considers transfers as payments made 
in exchange services provided by family heads (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; 
Kotlikoff, Shoven and Spivak, 1986). However, there are also papers where 
parental transfers are not significant for children (Wolff 2006). 
In this paper we explore the motivation of monetary transfers received by 
household heads. For this reason, we select a sample of Italian families from the 
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2006 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
dataset. The empirical analysis is divided into two parts. First, we consider the 
transfer decision and try to account for the factors that affect the probability that 
the household member will receive a transfer. Next, we restrict our analysis to 
those families who did receive a positive transfer and examine the factors that 
affect the size of the transfer. Since the economic interest in the intrinsic 
explanation of monetary transfers is supported by the efficacy of policy makers 
instruments, we also explore the relationship between private and public financial 
transfers. This analysis assumes a particular relevance in this period, in which the 
most heavy financial crisis after that of 1929 produces still negative effects to real 
economy. The main contribution to the existing literature is to investigate the 
social motivation of private transfers and their implications in terms of policy in a 
unified framework.   
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical 
framework of private transfers; Section 3 outlines the effects of Government 
policies according to the link between public and private transfers. Section 4 
presents the dataset while Section 5 illustrates models implemented in the analysis. 
Section 6 shows and discusses the empirical results; in Section 7 we carry out an 
interesting analysis on the relationship between public and private transfers. 
Section 8 concludes and points out suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework of Private Transfers 
The simplest approach to model the monetary transfer is to consider the utility of 
the recipient into the utility function of the donor. According to Becker (1974), it 
is assumed that individual i is concerned about j and maximizes the utility function 
Ui = (xi , Uj(xj )) where xi and xj represent the consumption of i and j respectively. 
The initial income levels of i and j are respectively yi and yj , while gi is a monetary 
transfer from i to j. Thus, the budget constraints for i and j may be written as: 
xi + gi = yi   (1) 
xj = yj + gi   (2) 
 The maximization problem for individual i becomes: 
4 
 
Max Ui = (xi , Uj(xj ))   
s. t. xi + xj = yi + yj   (3) 
From (1) we may derive: 
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This is a relevant theoretical result, which is widely used in the empirical analysis 
to test for the altruism hypothesis. Choosing the interpretation that the individual 
i is the parent and the individual j is children in a family environment, Altonji, 
Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1997) find that an increase in parent’s income leads to an 
increase in the transfer and that an increase in the child’s income leads to a 
decrease in the transfer, but the estimates of these effects are much smaller in 
absolute value than what would be computed in (5). For this reason, they reject 
the hypothesis of pure altruism. We may distinguish two approaches to explain 
the monetary transfers in the empirical literature. A first approach is introduced 
by Cox (1987): altruistic parents transfer economic means to their children in 
exchange for services. In this case, if income increases, the threat point of the 
child also increases and the parent may have to increase his transfer to obtain the 
desired services. If we find a positive correlation between recipient’s income and 
transfer amount in the data, then the exchange regime hypothesis is verified. In 
particular, this hypothesis has been tested in many papers and for different 
countries (Cox 1987; Cox and Rank 1992; Cox, Eser and Jimenex 1998; Secondi 
1997).  
A second approach is the one by Cigno, Giannelli and Rosati (1998). They assume 
that individuals live for three periods and derive utility from their own 
consumption. Family network system allow the reallocation of consumption over 
the life cycle: each middle-aged individual must transfer a specified amount of 
income to each of the children and a specified amount of income to each of the 
parents. In this context, credit rationing has a positive effect on the probability of 
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intrafamily transfers, while in the pure altruism model and in the exchange one an 
increase in rationing produces a decrease in the donor’s income and therefore a 
decrease of the transfer. In particular, Cigno, Giannelli and Rosati (1998) test for 
their hypothesis by using Italian data. 
Following the Cox (1987)’s line of research, in this paper we investigate the pure 
altruism versus exchange hypothesis by using the 2006 European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset. The empirical analysis is 
divided into two parts. First, we consider the transfer decision and try to account 
for the factors that affect the probability that the household member will receive a 
transfer. Next, we restrict our analysis to those families who did receive a positive 
transfer and examine the factors that affect the size of the transfer. 
 
3. Public and Private Transfers: Consequences of Government 
Policies 
Family intergenerational transfers have received increasing interest in the 
economic literature because of their interaction with Government policies. 
Indeed, if private and public transfers are ‘substitutes’, an increase of public 
transfers might lead to a decrease in private transfers, the so-called ‘crowding-out’ 
effect of policy makers instruments. This effect may realize in two ways: firstly, 
children may reduce private transfers to their retired parents because of the 
increase of public funds; secondly, parents could use the public transfers they 
receive to increase their private transfers to children. This topic is particularly 
interesting in those European developed countries characterized by a growing 
population of older people and a very low fertility rate (Disney and Johnson, 
2001), such as Italy.  
The reaction of private transfers to Government policies depends on the intrinsic 
motivation for giving. If private transfers are explained by pure altruism (Barro, 
1974), as it is described in the previous section, a public policy that forces a 
transfer from child to parent, through the pension system, but leaves aggregate 
family income unchanged will have no effect on any family member’s 
consumption. Indeed, the parents will increase private transfers by the exact 
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amount of the due public transfer to assure consumption of both at the previous 
level. Thus, in this case the policy makers instruments are not efficacious.  
If private transfers are motivated by exchange regime hypothesis (Cox, 1987), 
transfers from parents may increase in response to an increase in the child’s 
income because the child now needs more compensation to assure the same 
amount of services. Thus, in this case exchange motivated transfers may 
strengthen the effects of public transfers. For this reason, this effect is also called 
‘crowding in’ effect in the empirical literature (Kunemund and Rein, 1999). 
As far as the empirical evidence is concerned, Cox and Jimenez (1992) report that 
families in Peru who obtain social security income are slightly less likely to get 
private monetary transfers. In particular, simulation models suggest that private 
transfers would be about 20% higher without a social security programme. In this 
case, we may observe a crowding-out effect, but it is less than expected by models 
of pure altruism (100%). Also Jensen (2003) report similar results from South-
Africa data. Results suggest that each rand of public pension income to elderly 
people leads to a decrease of about 30% rand in private transfers. Schoeni (2002) 
explore the interaction between public and private transfers to unemployed 
people in the USA. He finds that a substantial proportion (24 to 40 cents per 
dollar) of the unemployed who obtain public benefits receive private support as 
well, while Cox and Jakubson (1995), by investigating data of anti-poverty 
programme in the USA, find a crowding-in effect. Attias-Donfut and Wolff 
(2000) find a strong positive correlation between the receipt of public transfers 
and the probability of receiving financial help from parents in France. Kunemund 
and Rein (1999) implement an International analysis to test the existence of 
crowding-in versus crowding-out effect. They consider Canada, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, Germany and the USA. Results suggest that in Germany the social 
security system does not lead to a crowding-out effect; elderly German people do 
not receive less help with money than elderly people in the other countries, as 
expected by crowding-out hypothesis. Reil-Held (2006) investigates the 
relationship between private and public financial transfers to and elderly people 
using data from Germany. Results suggest a positive correlation between the 
amount of public transfers elderly people receive and in the private transfers they 
give. On the other hand, we may observe that for the much smaller group of 
elderly people who receive private financial support, that transfers are negatively 
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correlated with the public transfers they receive. Thus, the crowding-out effect 
may not rejected. 
Now, we are living the most heavy financial crisis after that of 1929, as 
documented also in Blanchard (2009). Because of this serious crisis, policy makers 
must realize actions to curb public debt. This means also a reduction of public 
transfers. For this reason, we believe that in this particular period, the interest for 
the link between private and public transfers assumes a fundamental relevance for 
evaluate the effects of negative policy instruments.  
 
4. Data  
In this paper we select a sample of Italian families from the 2006 European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset. The EU-SILC 
database provides comparable, cross sectional and longitudinal multidimensional 
data on income, social exclusion and living conditions performed in Member 
States (MS) of the European Community. The reference population of EU-SILC 
is all private households and their current heads residing in the territory of the MS 
at the time of data collection. The EU-SILC data is thus a national representative 
sample of all person aged 16 and over residing in private households within the 
country. Four types of data are gathered in EU-SILC: 1) variables measured at the 
household level; 2) information on household size and composition and basic 
characteristics of household heads; 3) income and other more complex variables 
measured at the personal level, but aggregated to construct household-level 
variables; 4) variables collected at the personal level. The items included in the 
micro data regards health, education, child care, housing, demographic and 
employment characteristics, income. 
In this paper we use 2006 wave of EU-SILC which provides information on 
social participation of respondents, too. Our sample is composed by 21499 
household heads who are aged between 16 and 80 in 2006. All the variables used 
in the analysis are described in detail in Appendix A. Summary statistics are 
reported in Table 1. 
The micro data contains a question, hy080, in which households report regular 
inter-household cash transfer received. This variable refers to regular monetary  
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  Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
 
      All sample                                           Recipients                                       Nonrecipients 
Variable 
     Mean        Std. Dev.      Mean 
      Std. 
Dev. 
        Mean 
        Std. 
Dev. 
Transfer receipt 0.05 0.21     
Transfer amount 238.59 1655.16 5150.04 5819.90 0 0 
Household income 28744.55 22964.20 22348.75 18035.11 29055.24 23132.32 
Mean household 
income 
33485.51 5264.97 32959.95 5407.65 33511.04 5256.74 
Public transfers 480.90 635.86 207.12 416.16 494.19 641.67 
Female 0.29 0.45 0.58 0.49 0.28 0.45 
Married 0.62 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.63 0.48 
Age30-39 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.40 0.14 0.34 
Age40-49 0.19            0.39 0.27 0.44 0.19 0.39 
Age50-59 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.39 
Age>60 0.45 0.50 0.24 0.42 0.46 0.50 
No  edu 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22 
Primary edu 0.28 0.45 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.45 
Secondary edu 0.57 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.56 0.49 
Household size  2.53 1.27 2.40 1.29 2.54 1.27 
Children0_2 0.05 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.24 
Children3_5 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.25 
Children6_15 0.23 0.56 0.31 0.60 0.23 0.55 
Children16_24 0.23 0.55 0.36 0.66 0.23 0.55 
EU birth 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 
OTH birth 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18 
EU citizenship 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.05 
OTH citizenship   0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15 
Homeowner 0.75 0.43 0.56 0.50 0.76 0.43 
Rooms 3.46 1.14 3.31 1.10 3.47 1.14 
Lands and buildings 0.21 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.41 
Savings  0.47 0.50 0.29 0.46 0.47 0.50 
Formal voluntary activities 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 
Informal voluntary 
activities 
0.13 0.33 0.17 0.37 0.13 0.33 
North East  0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 
Centre 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.42 
South 0.20 0.40 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.40 
Islands  0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 
Observation          21499               996                        20503 
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amounts received from other households or persons. It includes: i) compulsory 
alimony and child support; ii) voluntary alimony and child support received on 
regular basis; iii) regular cash support from persons other than household heads; 
iv) regular cash support from household in other countries. Transfers among 
households or persons who live in the same household are not considered in the 
survey.  
A notable feature of transfers in the 2006 survey is that only a minority of 
household heads received them. Indeed, the data shows that 996 household heads 
receive cash transfers, the 5 percent of the full sample (transfer receipt in Table 1). 
Tables 1 reports the average levels of transfers (transfer amount) and the total 
(disposal) household income for the household heads surveyed. 
Averages are reported separately for all sample, recipients and nonrecipients. 
While the average size of cash transfers were around 239 euro in the full sample, 
for household heads who received money transfers in 2006, average size of these 
transfers were 5150 euro, 23 per cent of the total disposal household income. 
Total disposal household income, hy020 variable in EU-SILC1, is lower in the 
recipients sample (22348 euro) than in all sample (28744 euro). Transfers flow 
from the old to the young, and vice versa. As shown in Figure 1, the age pattern 
of transfers received has a peak in the 30-40 years range, but notable is also the 
70-80 years range.   
                                                           
1 Regarding as yh020 is computed see EU-SILC variables descriptions years 2006. 
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Figure 1. Transfers received by age of recipients, 2006
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Among the variables that are likely to affect transfers received, we first account 
for the income of the donors. The theories discussed in previous sections predict 
that the likelihood of a transfer taking place as well as the amount of the transfer 
will increase as the income of the donor increases. Since the data does not provide  
direct information on source of transfers received, we do not know the income of 
donors. In this paper, the income of donors is proxied by the mean value of the 
total disposal household income for each of the 3 categories of urbanization, 
db100 variable - densely populated area, intermediate area, thinly populated area - 
in each of the 20 Italian regions. Thus, in Table 1, mean household income is the 
mean value of household income of local areas of the region in which the 
household head resides. Looking at Table 1, the mean household income is lower 
for transfer recipients, indicating that household heads who live in local areas 
relatively poorer have a lower probability of receiving transfers. 
In order to address the interaction between private and public transfers, we use 
additional variables available in the Italian sample. Public transfers mainly consist 
of social pensions, disability allowances and pensions, old age and retirement 
pensions, survivors’ pensions. Table 1 shows that public transfers, on average, are 
lower in the recipients sample (207 euro) than in the all sample (481 euro). 
A number of demographic variables are included among the explanatory variables. 
These variables are: gender, marital status, age, education, household size, 
presence and age of children, country of birth, citizenship, homeownership, and 
three indicators of household wealth. Wealth variables comprise the number of 
rooms available to the household, if household head owns lands and other 
buildings and if household head has savings. Furthermore, we include formal and 
informal voluntary activities supplied by household head. Finally, the Italian 
macro-regional dummies are also taken into account. Table 1 shows that all 
sample and recipients sample differ significantly. In the all sample, around 60 per 
cent of household heads are male and married and have a secondary education. 
The largest group of individuals, 45 per cent, is aged 60 and more. Furthermore, 
23 per cent of the sample comprises household heads with children aged between 
16 and 24, 75 percent are homeowners and 47 per cent are saver person. In the 
recipients sample, about 60 per cent of household heads are female and no 
married and have a secondary education. The largest group of respondents, 27 per 
cent, is aged between 40 and 49. Moreover, 36 per cent of the sample comprises 
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household heads with children aged between 16 and 24, while 56 percent are 
homeowners and only 29 per cent are saver person.    
 
5. Empirical Framework 
The empirical analysis is divided into two parts. First, we consider the transfer 
decision and try to account for the factors that affect the probability that the 
household heads will receive a transfer. Both the altruism and exchange theory 
predict an inverse relation between the recipient’s income and the probability of 
receiving a transfer. Next, we restrict our analysis to those families who did 
receive a positive transfer and examine the factors that affect the size of the 
transfer. Here the altruism theory predict a negative relation between the 
recipient’s income and the size of the transfers, while exchange allows for a 
positive relation. 
A Probit model is estimated to explain the probability of receiving a private 
transfer: 
iidirii ZIIT εαααα ++++=
'
3210     (6) 
where “i” index household head, Ti is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if 
the household head receives a transfer and 0 otherwise. Iri  is recipient’s income 
and Idi is donor’s income, Zi is a vector including the other covariates described in 
section III, and iε is the error term. We hypothesize that if transfers are motivated 
by altruism or self-interest, 1α is negative and 2α is positive, indicating that the 
lower the recipient’s income and the higher the donor’ s income, the higher the 
likelihood of a transfer taking place. 
An ordinary Least Squares is estimated to explain the size of the transfer. The 
dependent variable is the amount of the transfer received by the household head, 
iST . The equation for iST  is given by 
iidirii ZIIST µββββ ++++= '3210   (7) 
where the explanatory variables are the same as those used for the study of the 
transfer decision. The coefficient of interest is 1β . Both the altruism and exchange 
theory predict a negative value for 1β , while exchange allows for a positive value 
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of 1β . Because of the positive correlation between donor’s income and transfers 
amounts, the coefficient on 2β is expected to be positive for each transfer motive. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports the results of the estimation of the probability of receiving a 
private transfer. Equation (6) is estimated for all sample. The estimated probit 
coefficients on recipient’s and donor’s income have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant, respectively, at 1 and 5 per cent. These estimates are 
consistent with both altruism and exchange explanation. This result is in line with 
previous studies of Cox (1987) and Secondi (1997).  
Household head who are women are more likely to receive transfers while people 
who are married have a lower probability of receiving financial transfers than their 
unmarried counterparts (reference category). Following Cox (1987), the findings 
for gender are reconciled with altruistic and exchange models. In the altruistic 
explanation, the probability of transfer receipt is higher for female because private 
transfers may compensate women for wage discrimination or interrupt carriers. In 
the exchange explanation, women, for choice or discriminations, are concentrated 
in activities that are related to family-oriented services (home production). Home 
production would raise the demand price and lower the supply price of services 
(Cox 1987, 535). The inverse relationship between marital status and the 
probability of transfer receipt is difficult to explain in the context of the altruistic 
model. Hence, we re-estimated the transfer equation in Table 2 changing the 
married variable with a separated/divorced variable. This dummy is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent. As alimonies are included in private support, 
we interpret this finding as the monetary compensation for the events of 
separation and divorce. An alternative explanation related to the exchange model 
is that marriage raises the implicit supply price of services provided to other 
household heads. Household responsibilities associated with marriage make it less 
likely for a married couple to exchange services for private transfer income (Cox 
1987, 536).          
 
 
 
13 
 
 Table 2. Probit estimates of receiving a transfer: all sample  
 
   I       II 
Variable              Coef.                        Std. Err.                            dF/dx                    Std. Err. 
Household income (ln) -0.221*** 0.025 -0.015*** 0.002 
Mean household income (ln)  0.329** 0.153  0.022** 0.010 
Female  0.540*** 0.041  0.045*** 0.045 
Married -0.242*** 0.049 -0.017*** 0.004 
Age30-39 -0.168** 0.075 -0.010** 0.004 
Age40-49 -0.289*** 0.076 -0.016*** 0.004 
Age50-59 -0.384*** 0.079 -0.021*** 0.003 
Age>60 -0.652*** 0.078 -0.043*** 0.005 
No  edu -0.499*** 0.102 -0.022*** 0.003 
Primary edu -0.379*** 0.067 -0.022*** 0.003 
Secondary edu -0.190*** 0.052 -0.013*** 0.004 
Household size   0.066*** 0.025  0.004*** 0.002 
Children0_2 -0.086 0.075 -0.006 0.005 
Children3_5 -0.149** 0.071 -0.010** 0.005 
Children6_15  0.008 0.036  0.000 0.002 
Children16_24  0.164*** 0.036  0.011*** 0.002 
EU birth -0.235 0.176 -0.013 0.005 
OTH birth  0.039 0.113  0.003 0.008 
EU citizenship  0.431 0.283  0.043 0.039 
OTH citizenship   -0.257* 0.150 -0.014* 0.006 
Homeowner -0.323*** 0.036 -0.017*** 0.003 
Rooms  0.025 0.016  0.002 0.001 
Lands and buildings  0.040 0.044  0.003 0.003 
Savings  -0.242*** 0.036 -0.016*** 0.002 
Formal voluntary activities 0.031 0.059  0.002 0.004 
Informal voluntary activities  0.160*** 0.045  0.012*** 0.004 
North East        0.059              0.050  0.004 0.003 
Centre       0.117**              0.049  0.008** 0.004 
South        0.292***              0.062  0.023*** 0.006 
Islands       0.203**              0.080  0.016** 0.007 
No. of observations 21217 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 
Log-likelihood -3451.76 
Note. The dependent variable is equal to one if the household head receives a transfer and 0 otherwise. The independent 
variables are described in Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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The pattern of old to young people is evidenced by the coefficients on the age 
dummies. Compared to the omitted category of household heads in their twenties, 
heads in their forties, fifties and especially those aged 60 and over are significantly 
less likely to be transfer recipients.  
Household heads who are well-educated and member of larger families are also 
more likely to receive transfers. The direct relationship between household size 
and the probability of transfer receipt can be explained in the context of the 
altruistic model. Larger families have more potential donors. Hence, if altruism is 
the motive for transfers, household size should increase the probability of transfer 
receipt.  
However,  having children aged between 3 and 5 decreases the probability of 
receiving transfers while having children age between 16 and 24 increases the 
likely to have monetary support. Following Cox (1987, 556), the relationship 
between young children and the probability of transfer receipt can be explained in 
the context of the exchange model. Young children place demands on the time of 
household heads, presumably causing a cutback in the level of services that the 
household supplies to others.  
Household heads who citizenship is not that of European union have lower 
probability of receiving money transfers than those who citizenship is in the 
country of residence (reference category).  
Clear effect of wealth variables can be inferred from the estimated coefficients. 
Homeowner and savings show a negative coefficient, statistically significant at 1 
per cent. Therefore, these variables are associated with a lower probability of 
receiving financial transfers. Finally, household heads who undertake private 
activities to help others as well as those resides in the Southern regions of Italy 
have more likely to receive financial support.  
The analysis of the probability of receiving transfers is only sufficient to provide 
evidence in favor or against the altruism and exchange theories. It is necessary to 
look at the determinants of the size of the transfers.  
Table 3 reports the ordinary least square results of the estimation of the size of 
financial transfer. Equation (7) is estimated for the recipients sample. The 
estimated OLS coefficient on recipient’s income is positive and statistically 
significant at 1 per cent. For the average recipient with an income of about 22348 
euro, one percent increase in annual income is predicted to raise the amount of 
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transfers by 0.402, from sample mean of about 5150 to 7220 euro. The positive 
relationship between recipient’s income and transfer amount received is consistent 
with exchange theory. According to the exchange framework, this result seems to 
indicate that recipients with higher income ask for higher payments in exchange 
for services provides. This suggestion is confirmed by the estimated coefficients 
on age dummies. Indeed, the results reported in Table 3 show that compared to 
the omitted category of household heads in their twenties, recipients in their fifties 
receive less transfers. 
Looking at the other coefficients in Table 3, the mean household income, the 
proxy of donor’s income, has a positive and significant impact on the size of 
transfers, as expected. Hence, the positive relationship between donor’s income 
and transfer amount received is also consistent with exchange theory. It also 
appears that gender and education play roles in determining the amount of 
transfers received. We have discussed above as the finding on gender is in line 
with the exchange explanation. While household size decreases the size of 
transfers, the coefficient on children aged between 16 and 24 has a positive effect 
(both variables statistically significant at 5 per cent). An exchange interpretation of 
these findings may be the following: household size raises the implicit supply price 
of services provided to other household heads while adult children (aged 16 and 
above) presumably causing a rise in the level (and perhaps quality) of services that 
the household supplies to others. 
Household heads who citizenship is that of European union receive more 
transfers amount than those who citizenship is in the country of residence 
(reference category). Lands and buildings is the only wealth variable with a 
significant coefficient (at 5 per cent). This variable is positively correlated with the 
size of transfers. Since land and building are an indicator of permanent income, 
the positive coefficient seems to reinforce the positive correlation on household 
income and providing additional evidence for the exchange theory: recipients with 
higher current and permanent income receive higher transfers. Finally, household 
heads who live in North East regions receives less cash transfers than those who 
lives in Nord West regions (reference category). 
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   Table 3. Least-squares estimates of the amount of transfers received: recipients  
 
Variable                   Coef.             Std. Err. 
Household income (ln)   0.402*** 0.040 
Mean household income (ln)   0.728** 0.341 
Female   0.285*** 0.086 
Married -0.007 0.090 
Age30-39   0.004 0.148 
Age40-49 -0.343** 0.148 
Age50-59 -0.201 0.159 
Age>60 -0.172 0.166 
No  edu -0.877*** 0.198 
Primary edu -0.490*** 0.142 
Secondary edu -0.304*** 0.094 
Household size  -0.114** 0.050 
Children0_2 -0.035 0.161 
Children3_5   0.006 0.162 
Children6_15   0.077 0.075 
Children16_24   0.143** 0.071 
EU birth   0.842*** 0.289 
OTH birth   0.279 0.212 
EU citizenship -0.489 0.329 
OTH citizenship   -0.371 0.301 
Homeowner   0.032 0.072 
Rooms   0.042 0.034 
Lands and buildings   0.186** 0.090 
Savings    0.054 0.078 
Formal voluntary activities 0.074 0.123 
Informal voluntary activities 0.069 0.099 
North East   -0.298*** 0.104 
Centre  -0.045 0.097 
South   0.147 0.135 
Islands   0.033 0.188 
No. of observations  992 
Pseudo R-squared  0.20 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the size of the monetary transfer. The independent variables are 
described in Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, ** denote that the coefficient 
is significantly different from zero at the 1 and 5  percent levels, respectively. 
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7. Public and Private Transfers Analysis 
We now investigate the relationship between public transfers and private 
transfers. In particular, we test the crowding-out versus crowding-in hypothesis 
which a policy makers instrument can realize. Again, a probit and OLS models are 
used to estimate the probability of private transfer receipt and the amount 
received, respectively, in which among the independent variable we include also 
public transfers. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the estimation of the 
probability of receiving a private transfer and those of the OLS estimation of the 
size of financial transfer with public transfers as covariates. The overall results are 
similar to those that emerge from Tables 2 and 3. The coefficient of public 
transfers is in all model negative and statistically significant, respectively, at 1 per 
cent (probit) and 5 per cent (OLS). The negative correlation between public 
transfers and private transfer receipt shows that household heads who receive 
more public transfers must expect to receive a lower private financial help. For 
the average recipient with public transfers of about 207 euro, one percent increase 
in public transfers is predicted to decrease the amount of transfers by 0.032, from 
sample mean of about 5150 to 4985 euro. Hence, the hypothesis about an 
crowding-out process cannot be rejected.  
This result is similar to that of Reil-Held (2006) and could be due also to a better 
regularity of public transfers with respect to non-public incomes. However, our 
analysis about private intergenerational relations is very relevant for public policy. 
The significance of the empirical estimate shows a strong relation between the 
family and the state. Thus, every policy action has relevant effects on the family 
behavior about private assistance.  
From the results of the previous section, we learn that the motivation underlying 
the private transfer is also the exchange of future services. Indeed, we see that 
there is a significant positive coefficient on household income (ln): the higher the 
household income is, the higher bargaining power of donor is and then the higher 
the size of transfer must be.  
From the empirical results of this section, we observe that the public and the 
private transfers are substitutes: in case of public transfers increase, private 
transfers react negatively. In this framework, we try to explain the effect of a  
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Table 4. Probit estimates of receiving a private transfer with public transfers: all sample  
 
Note. See note Table 2. 
 
 
   I       II 
Variable              Coef.                        Std. Err.                            dF/dx                    Std. Err. 
Household income (ln) -0.201*** 0.025 -0.013*** 0.002 
Mean household income (ln)  0.312** 0.154  0.020** 0.010 
Public transfers (ln) -0.036*** 0.007 -0.002*** 0.000 
Female  0.553*** 0.041  0.046*** 0.004 
Married -0.275*** 0.049 -0.019*** 0.004 
Age30-39 -0.165** 0.075 -0.010** 0.004 
Age40-49 -0.275*** 0.076 -0.015*** 0.004 
Age50-59 -0.330*** 0.079 -0.018*** 0.004 
Age>60 -0.393*** 0.094 -0.025*** 0.006 
No  edu -0.412*** 0.103 -0.019*** 0.003 
Primary edu -0.319*** 0.068 -0.019*** 0.003 
Secondary edu -0.167*** 0.052 -0.011*** 0.004 
Household size   0.066*** 0.025  0.004*** 0.002 
Children0_2 -0.078 0.075 -0.005 0.005 
Children3_5 -0.142** 0.071 -0.009** 0.005 
Children6_15  0.013 0.036  0.001 0.002 
Children16_24  0.162*** 0.036  0.011*** 0.002 
EU birth -0.234 0.178 -0.012 0.007 
OTH birth  0.028 0.114  0.002 0.008 
EU citizenship  0.421 0.284  0.041 0.038 
OTH citizenship   -0.256* 0.151 -0.013* 0.006 
Homeowner -0.227*** 0.036 -0.017*** 0.003 
Rooms  0.025 0.016  0.002 0.001 
Lands and buildings  0.037 0.044  0.002 0.003 
Savings  -0.241*** 0.036 -0.016*** 0.002 
Formal voluntary activities 0.026 0.059  0.002 0.004 
Informal voluntary activities  0.159*** 0.045  0.012*** 0.004 
North East        0.059              0.050  0.004 0.003 
Centre       0.119**              0.049  0.008** 0.004 
South        0.295***              0.063  0.023*** 0.006 
Islands       0.200**              0.080  0.015** 0.007 
No. of observations 21217 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 
Log-likelihood -3435.12 
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Table 5. Least-squares estimates of the amount of private transfers received and public transfers: recipients  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the size of the monetary transfer. The independent variables are 
described in Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
  
Variable                   Coef.             Std. Err. 
Household income (ln)   0.425*** 0.040 
Mean household income (ln)   0.705** 0.342 
Public transfers (ln) -0.032** 0.013 
Female   0.275*** 0.086 
Married -0.030 0.090 
Age30-39   0.001 0.147 
Age40-49 -0.331** 0.148 
Age50-59 -0.177 0.158 
Age>60  0.024 0.183 
No  edu -0.763*** 0.205 
Primary edu -0.445*** 0.143 
Secondary edu -0.286*** 0.094 
Household size  -0.121** 0.050 
Children0_2 -0.032 0.161 
Children3_5   0.003 0.162 
Children6_15   0.077 0.075 
Children16_24 
  0.142** 0.072 
EU birth   0.880*** 0.302 
OTH birth   0.280 0.215 
EU citizenship -0.518 0.340 
OTH citizenship   -0.387 0.300 
Homeowner   0.023 0.073 
Rooms   0.041 0.034 
Lands and buildings   0.174* 0.089 
Savings    0.052 0.078 
Formal voluntary activities 0.073 0.123 
Informal voluntary activities 0.054 0.099 
North East   -0.304*** 0.104 
Centre  -0.041 0.097 
South   0.149 0.135 
Islands   0.030 0.188 
No. of observations  992 
Pseudo R-squared  0.20 
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reduction in public transfers because of the international financial crisis involving 
the public debt of states. Since public and private transfers are substitutes, we may 
expect a positive crowding-out effect on private financial help after a decrease of 
public transfers. But since the amount of resources collected by state are not 
distributed to the families, then we may expect also a reduction of household 
incomes and then a decrease of private transfers, due to a negative crowding-in 
effect. Thus, the final result cannot be identified well, because of two opposite 
forces. For this reason, this topic needs further investigation to pick out other 
important factors able to describe which force is prevalent. 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we explore the motivation of monetary transfers received by 
household heads. Indeed, the financial transfers may be motivated by altruism or 
by the expectation of future services. For this reason, we select a sample of Italian 
families from the 2006 European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset. The empirical analysis is divided into two parts. 
First, we consider the transfer decision and try to account for the factors that 
affect the probability that the household member will receive a transfer. Next, we 
restrict our analysis to those families who did receive a positive transfer and 
examine the factors that affect the size of the transfer. Because of the interesting 
interaction between family intergenerational transfers and Government policies,  
we also explore the relationship between private and public financial transfers. 
The main contribution to the existing literature is to investigate the social 
motivation of private transfers and their implications in terms of policy in a 
unified framework.   
As far as the motivation underlying the private transfers is concerned, the 
estimated probit coefficients on recipient’s and donor’s income have the expected 
signs and are statistically significant, respectively, at 1 and 5 per cent. These 
estimates are consistent with both altruism and exchange. This result and those 
relative to the explanatory variables are in line with previous studies of Cox (1987) 
and Secondi (1997). Indeed, household head who are women are more likely to 
receive transfers while people who are married have a lower probability of 
receiving financial transfers than their unmarried counterparts (reference 
category). Following Cox (1987), the findings for gender are reconciled with 
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altruistic and exchange models. In the altruistic explanation, the probability of 
transfer receipt is higher for female because private transfers may compensate 
women for wage discrimination or interrupt carriers. In the exchange explanation, 
women, for choice or discriminations, are concentrated in activities that are 
related to family-oriented services (home production). Home production would 
raise the demand price and lower the supply price of services (Cox 1987, 535). 
The inverse relationship between marital status and the probability of transfer 
receipt is difficult to explain in the context of the altruistic model. Hence, we re-
estimated the transfer equation changing the married variable with a 
separated/divorced variable. This dummy is positive and statistically significant at 
1 per cent. As alimonies are included in private support, we interpret this finding 
as the monetary compensation for the events of separation and divorce. An 
alternative explanation related to the exchange model is that marriage raises the 
implicit supply price of services provided to other household heads. Household 
responsibilities associated with marriage make it less likely for a married couple to 
exchange services for private transfer income (Cox 1987, 536).       
The pattern of old to young people is evidenced by the coefficients on the age 
dummies. Compared to the omitted category of household heads in their twenties, 
heads in their forties, fifties and especially those aged 60 and over are significantly 
less likely to be transfer recipients.  
Household heads who are well-educated and member of larger families are also 
more likely to receive transfers. The direct relationship between household size 
and the probability of transfer receipt can be explained in the context of the 
altruistic model. Larger families have more potential donors. Hence, if altruism is 
the motive for transfers, household size should increase the probability of transfer 
receipt.  
However,  having children aged between 3 and 5 decreases the probability of 
receiving transfers while having children age between 16 and 24 increases the 
likely to have monetary support. Following Cox (1987, 556), the relationship 
between young children and the probability of transfer receipt can be explained in 
the context of the exchange model. Young children place demands on the time of 
household heads, presumably causing a cutback in the level of services that the 
household supplies to others.     
However, the analysis of the probability of receiving transfers is only sufficient to 
provide evidence in favor or against the altruism and exchange theories. It is 
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necessary to look at the determinants of the size of the transfers. The estimated 
OLS coefficient on recipient’s income is positive and statistically significant at 1 
per cent. For the average recipient with an income of about 22348 euro, one 
percent increase in annual income is predicted to raise the amount of transfers by 
0.402, from sample mean of about 5150 to 7220 euro. The positive relationship 
between recipient’s income and transfer amount received is consistent with 
exchange theory. According to the exchange framework, this result seems to 
indicate that recipients with higher income ask for higher payments in exchange 
for services provides. This suggestion is confirmed by the estimated coefficients 
on age dummies. Indeed, the results show that compared to the omitted category 
of household heads in their twenties, recipients in their fifties receive less 
transfers. 
 
As far as the relationship between the public and private transfers is concerned, 
again a probit and OLS models are used to estimate the probability of private 
transfer receipt and the amount received, respectively, in which among the 
independent variable we include also public transfers. The coefficient of public 
transfers is in all model negative and statistically significant, respectively, at 1 per 
cent (probit) and 5 per cent (OLS). The negative correlation between public 
transfers and private transfer receipt shows that household heads who receive 
more public transfers must expect to receive a lower private financial help. For 
the average recipient with public transfers of about 207 euro, one percent increase 
in public transfers is predicted to decrease the amount of transfers by 0.032, from 
sample mean of about 5150 to 4985 euro. Hence, the hypothesis about an 
crowding-out process cannot be rejected.  
This result is similar to that of Reil-Held (2006) and could be due also to a better 
regularity of public transfers with respect to non-public incomes. However, our 
analysis about private intergenerational relations is very relevant for public policy. 
The significance of the empirical estimate shows a strong relation between the 
family and the state. Thus, every policy action has relevant effects on the family 
behavior about private assistance.  
From one hand, we learn that the motivation underlying the private transfer is 
also the exchange of future services. Indeed, we see that there is a significant 
positive coefficient on household income (ln): the higher the household income 
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is, the higher bargaining power of donor is and then the higher the size of transfer 
must be.  
From the other hand, we observe that the public and the private transfers are 
substitutes: in case of public transfers increase, private transfers react negatively. 
In this framework, we try to explain the effect of a reduction in public transfers 
because of the international financial crisis involving the public debt of states. 
Since public and private transfers are substitutes, we may expect a positive 
crowding-out effect on private financial help after a decrease of public transfers. 
But since the amount of resources collected by state are not distributed to the 
families, then we may expect also a reduction of household incomes and then a 
decrease of private transfers, due to a negative crowding-in effect. Thus, the final 
result cannot be identified well, because of two opposite forces. For this reason, 
this topic needs further investigation to pick out other important factors able to 
describe which force is prevalent. 
Naturally, our analysis is implemented in a simple empirical environment and can 
be improved. First, we should take into account also non-monetary help in the 
private support analysis. Second, we should investigate not only the receipt 
transfer but also the giving of transfers. Third, we may explore the endogeneity 
issue of particular variables. Finally, we might use a dynamic model to verify 
whether our empirical results are sensitive to the lag between the private and 
public transfers.  
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variable Description 
Dependent variable 
Transfer amount Dummy 1. If household head receives a transfer; 0 otherwise 
Transfers receipt Regular inter-household cash transfers received (in euro) 
Key independent variables 
Household income  Net total disposal household income (in euro) without inflation factor 
Mean Household income The mean value of the household income for each of the 3 categories of degree of urbanization in each 
of the 20 Italian regions 
Public transfers Sum (in euro) of social pensions, disability allowances and pensions, old age and retirement pensions, 
survivors’ pensions 
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
Female Dummy, 1 if female; 0 otherwise. Reference group: male 
Married Dummy, 1 if married ; 0 otherwise;  Reference group: others marital status 
Age30-39 Dummy, 1 if age is between 30 and 39; 0 otherwise. Reference group: age16-29 
Age40-49 Dummy, 1 if age is between 40 and 49; 0 otherwise.  
Age50-59 Dummy, 1 if age is between 50 and 59; 0 otherwise 
Age>60 Dummy, 1 if age is above 60; 0 otherwise 
No edu Dummy, 1 if the respondent has no education; 0 otherwise. Reference group: tertiary education (18 
years and more) 
Primary edu Dummy, 1 if the respondent has primary education (elementary school: 5 years); 0 otherwise 
Secondary edu Dummy, 1 if the respondent has secondary education (junior high school and diploma:  6 - 13 years); 0 
otherwise 
Household size  Number of household heads 
Children0_2 Number of own children ages 0 - 2 years old. Reference group: no children 
Children3_5 Number of own children ages 3 - 5 years old 
Children6_15 Number of own children ages 6 - 15 years old 
Children16_24 Number of own children ages 16 and 24 attending school 
EU birth Dummy, 1 if the country of birth is any European union country (EU25); 0 otherwise.  Reference 
group: country of residence 
OTH birth Dummy, 1 if the country of birth is any other country 
EU citizenship Dummy, 1 if the citizenship is that of any European union country. 0 otherwise. Reference group: 
country of residence.  
OTH citizenship   Dummy, 1 if  the citizenship is that of any other country 
Homeowner Dummy, 1 if the respondent owns the house where he /she lives; 0 otherwise 
Rooms Number of rooms available to the household 
Lands and buildings Dummy, 1 if the respondent owns lands and other buildings; 0 otherwise 
Savings  Dummy, 1 if the respondent has savings 
Formal and informal voluntary activities 
Formal voluntary activities Dummy, 1 if the respondent, during the last twelve months, participated in the unpaid work of charitable 
organizations, groups or clubs; 0 otherwise 
Informal voluntary 
activities 
Dummy, 1 if the respondent, during the last twelve months, undertook private activities to help 
someone; 0 otherwise 
Macro-regional dummies 
North East  Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in North east regions; 0 otherwise.  Reference group: North West 
Centre Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in Central regions; 0 otherwise 
South Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in Southern regions; 0 otherwise 
Islands Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in the Islands; 0 otherwise 
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